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KANT’S ReLIgIOuS ARgumeNT FOR THe 
exISTeNce OF gOD:  
THe uLTImATe DePeNDeNce OF HumAN 
DeSTINY ON DIVINe ASSISTANce
Stephen R. Palmquist
After reviewing Kant’s well-known criticisms of the traditional proofs of 
god’s existence and his preferred moral argument, this paper presents a de-
tailed analysis of a densely-packed theistic argument in Religion within the 
Bounds of Bare Reason. Humanity’s ultimate moral destiny can be fulfilled 
only through organized religion, for only by participating in a religious  
community (or “church”) can we overcome the evil in human nature. Yet 
we cannot conceive how such a community can even be founded without 
presupposing god’s existence. Viewing god as the internal moral lawgiv-
er, empowering a community of believers, is Kant’s ultimate rationale for  
theistic belief.
I. The Practical Orientation of Kantian Theology
Kant is well known for attacking three traditional attempts to prove 
god’s existence: the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological 
(or teleological) arguments. All such “theoretical” arguments inevita-
bly fail, he claimed, because their aim (achieving certain knowledge of 
god’s existence) transcends the capabilities of human reason. Viewed 
from the theoretical standpoint, god is not an object of possible human 
knowledge, but an idea that inevitably arises as a by-product of the to-
talizing tendencies of human reason. The very process of obtaining em-
pirical knowledge gives rise to the concept “god,” and this enables us 
to think and reason about what god’s nature must be if god exists; yet 
we have no “intuition” of god (neither through sensible input nor in any 
“pure” form), so we can have no reasonable hope of obtaining theoretical 
knowledge of god’s existence.
All three traditional arguments, in Kant’s estimation, aim to establish 
such theoretical certainty, so they are all bound to fail. Ontological argu-
ments fail because we cannot reason from a pure concept (“god”) to an ac-
tual object (God, as the goal of theoretical proof). cosmological arguments 
fail because we cannot intuit the entire existing universe (the “world” god 
is supposed to have created) as an empirical object, so we do not know 
whether it must obey the same causal laws that individual objects within 
the empirically knowable universe must obey. And teleological arguments 
fail to establish knowledge (though they can inspire belief), because we 
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cannot know whether the powerful intelligence that seems to have shaped 
the world for our benefit actually created it as well.1
ever since mendelssohn portrayed Kant as an anti-metaphysical “all-
destroyer” who was supposedly aiming to put an end to theology and reli-
gion, this reputation has been imputed to Kant by many commentators. In 
the mid-nineteenth century the influential German writer, Heinrich Heine, 
intensified this traditional reading by calling Kant the “arch-destroyer in 
the realm of thought” who put forward “destructive, world-annihilating 
thoughts.”2 He called Kant’s first Critique “the sword that slew deism in 
germany,”3 depicting its criticism of the tradi tional theistic proofs as “one 
of the [book’s] main points”—so important that we ought to “recognise 
everywhere visible in [the first Critique] his polemic against these proofs.”4 
The polemic’s goal, Heine argues, was to demonstrate that “this ideal . . . 
being, hitherto called God, is a mere fiction.”5
Thanks to a growing number of voices opposing this traditionally nega-
tive reading of Kantian theology in recent years, it is slowly coming to be 
recognized as a gross perversion of Kant’s intentions. many interpreters of 
Kant’s theological and religious views now agree that Kant intended his 
criticism of the traditional theistic arguments not as an assault on the valid-
ity of theology or religion, but as a preparation for a more authentic way 
of rationally affirming God’s existence.6 The traditional arguments, being 
theoretical, would not provide a suitable theological basis for religion, even 
1Kant advances these arguments in Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith [edinburgh: macmillan, 1929], hereafter CPR), Transcendental Dialectic, 
chapter III; page references cite the B edition. For a detailed explanation of what 
Kant’s theoretical arguments entail and why their failure does not rule out theistic 
belief, see Stephen Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of 
Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chap. IV and appendix IV.
2Heinrich Heine, Zur geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland 
(1859), trans. J. Snodgrass as Religion and Philosophy in germany (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1959), p. 109. 
3Ibid., p. 107. 
4Ibid., pp. 115–116. 
5Ibid., p. 115. 
6In addition to the various articles that culminated in Kant’s Critical Religion, 
see the collection of essays in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. chris 
L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana university Press, 
2006), where fourteen scholars share a common standpoint the editors of the 
latter volume call the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant. The Editors’ 
Introduction provides a thorough-going sketch of the history of the tradition-
ally negative approach, followed by an exhaustive overview of the books in 
english focusing on Kant’s philosophy of religion since Allen Wood’s Kant’s 
Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: cornell university Press, 1970) and michel Desp-
land’s Kant on History and Religion (montreal: mcgill-Queen’s university Press, 
1973) first turned the tide toward the affirmative. Although in most cases they 
did not explicitly align themselves with the manifesto proposed in my early 
article, “Immanuel Kant: A christian Philosopher?” (Faith and Philosophy 6.1 
[January 1989], pp. 65–75), interpreters since the early 1990s have been adopt-
ing a more and more affirmative approach to Kantian theology and philosophy 
of religion. 
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if they succeeded.7 Aiming to achieve scientific-type knowledge of god’s ex-
istence, rather than humble belief, their success would encourage human 
beings to believe we can manipulate god the way we manipulate objects in 
the natural world.
In place of the traditional theoretical arguments, Kant introduced an 
entirely new approach to arguing for god’s existence that he believed 
would have a more healthy influence on the way people view God. His 
special “moral” argument carries a more qualified practical validity: 
Kant never assigns it the status of an absolute proof, as the theoreti-
cal arguments claim to achieve. Wood’s explanation of the argument as 
constituting a “reductio ad absurdum practicum” (i.e., a proof that requires 
any atheistic moral person either to postulate god’s existence as an ex-
planation for why persevering in morally good conduct makes sense, or 
else to give up the claim that moral behavior is rational) is still one of the 
clearest and most persuasive accounts.8 Scholars have discussed the de-
tails of Kant’s moral argument so thoroughly that the generally accepted 
position is now that, at least in this instance, Kant saw his philosophy as 
having generally affirmative theological implications—though the more 
skeptical interpreters think Kant’s argument fails, rendering his affirma-
tion misplaced.
While the importance of Kant’s moral argument to his overall philo-
sophical system is now widely recognized, many commentators remain 
unconvinced that he also intended to make specifically religious affirma-
tions. Interpreters still tend to view Kant as having a highly abstract, 
excessively rational theology, with little or no relevance to the experi-
ence or belief affirmed by ordinary church-goers.9 The exceptions to this 
7In CPR, xxx, Kant explicitly states the goal of his critical philosophy is to 
protect religion and morality from the negative effects sophistical and skeptical 
philosophers can have on them. Similarly, in his Lectures on ethics (trans. Louis 
Infield [London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1930], pp. 86–87), he says: “In religion the 
knowledge of god is properly based on faith alone. . . . [So] it is not necessary for 
this belief [in god] to be susceptible of logical proof. . . . [For] sophistication is 
the error of refusing to accept any religion not based on a theology which can be 
apprehended by our reason. . . . Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous 
thing; our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove 
everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for religion.” 
8See Wood, Moral Religion, pp. 25–34. The vast subsequent literature on this 
argument need not be reviewed here. For an overview of the first twenty years of 
literature discussing Wood’s interpretation of the moral theory in Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason, see Stephen Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives: an architec-
tonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy (Lanham: university Press of America 
1993), §VIII.3.B. For a recent account of the alleged weaknesses of the argument 
from a more skeptically-minded interpreter, see Peter Byrne, Kant on God (Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2007), chaps. 5 and 6.
9For example, mark Lilla, “Kant’s Theological-Political Revolution,” The Review 
of Metaphysics 52.2 (December 1998), p. 412, says: “It is . . . hard to imagine anyone 
taking genuine comfort from immortality or god as Kant conceives them.” He 
later (p. 421) adds: “The postulates of immortality and god are the most Kant 
can offer to meet this threat [of self-contempt]. They are, to say the least, ghostly 
humanistic substitutes for the real thing. In fact, there is no resurrection from the 
dead or god to whom we can turn.” While this may be plausible as a depiction of 
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tendency are increasing as the affirmative approach gains momentum, 
with more and more scholars willing to see Kant’s philosophy, especially 
his later writings, as providing a stable foundation for a healthy and sus-
tainable religious life.10 The reason Kant often appears to adopt a nega-
tive approach to religion, especially in Religion, is that most examples of 
religious belief and practice in his day (as perhaps also today) were a 
far cry from conforming to the ideal he believed reason presents of the 
authentic religious life. Nevertheless, even among scholars who explicitly 
adopt the affirmative approach to interpreting Kant’s theology and reli-
gion, few have recognized that in Part Three of Religion Kant provides a 
new and strikingly different argument for God’s existence.11 Kant intends 
the Kantian theology we find in the three Critiques, I argue here (and elsewhere) 
that it is far from true of the position Kant advances in Religion within the Bounds of 
Bare Reason, (trans. g. di giovanni as Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. A. W. Wood and g. di giovanni [cambridge: 
cambridge university Press, 1996]), hereafter Religion. As we shall see in §IV, Lilla 
acknowledges a role for religion in Kant’s moral system, though he does not think 
it offers any more “comfort” than the postulates.
10In addition to the works already mentioned, the books by gene Fendt (For 
What May I Hope? [New York: Peter Lang, 1990]), Adina Davidovich (Religion as 
a Province of Meaning: The Kantian Foundations of Modern Theology [minneapolis, 
mN: Fortress Press, 1993]), Walter Lowe (Theology and Difference: The Wound of 
Reason [Indianapolis: Indiana university Press, 1993]), curtis H. Peters (Kant’s 
Philosophy of Hope [New York: Peter Lang, 1993)), Sidney Axinn (The Logic of Hope: 
extensions of Kant’s View of Religion [Amsterdam: editions Rodopi, 1994]), Regina 
Dell’Oro (From existence to the Ideal: Continuity and development in Kant’s Theology 
[New York: Peter Lang, 1994]), elizabeth galbraith (Kant and Theology: Was Kant 
a Closet Theologian? [London: International Scholars Publications, 1996]), John 
Hare (The Moral Gap: Kantian ethics, Human Limits, and God’s assistance [Oxford: 
clarendon Press, 1996]), charles Kielkopf (a Kantian Condemnation of atheistic 
despair: a declaration of dependence [New York: P. Lang, 1997]), and moore (Noble 
in Reason, Infinite in Faculty: Themes and Variations in Kant’s Moral and Religious 
Philosophy [London: Routledge, 2003]) are noteworthy, though not all of these 
authors go as far as they could in affirming the specifically religious significance 
of Kant’s philosophy.
11The argument appears in Religion pp. 97–99 (Part Three, Di vision One, §II). 
Allen Wood (“Rational Theology, moral Faith, and Religion,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul guyer, pp. 394–416 [cambridge: cambridge univer-
sity Press, 1992]) acknowl edges that Kant’s arguments in support of “faith in a 
divine grace” (p. 403) can be regarded as supple menting his moral argument, but 
does not call attention to this passage. Lenk identifies a “socio morphic” argument 
for god in the passage (“Sociomorphic Arguments for a moral god: Kant’s Second 
and Third moral Arguments for the Postulate of god’s existence,” Man and World 
22, p. 103), but leaves it undeveloped. Peters offers a formalized version of the 
argument (Philosophy of Hope, pp. 101–102), but without acknowledging the way 
it lends support for belief in god (see note 20, below). And John Hare (“Kant on 
Recognizing our Duties As god’s commands,” Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October, 
2000], p. 470) mentions the argument in passing, but says nothing about its distinct 
form or purpose in comparison to the moral argument, interpreting it instead as 
if it were based on Kant’s technical concept of the highest good, just as the moral 
argument is.
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this argument, I shall claim, to provide a great deal more “comfort” than 
the moral argument on its own ever could.12
my strategy will be to present the context and text of Kant’s “religious” 
argument (§II), then analyze its details (§III) and finally assess its valid-
ity and the applicability it may have to a community of religious believ-
ers (§IV). I shall argue that Kant employs this special argument to justify 
his explicit (but often neglected) claim that organized religion is necessary 
for the fulfillment of humanity’s ultimate moral quest. Lest I (or Kant) 
be accused of arguing in a circle, I must add that the term “religious” 
here refers not to belief in god, but to participation in a community that 
has the (moral) character Kant refers to as “religious.” (Kant’s individualist 
version of this special argument will be discussed only briefly, in §IV.) If 
the argument’s inferences are valid, it takes us significantly further in our 
philosophical quest for a justification of religious belief than does Kant’s 
moral argument on its own, for its conclusion offers religious believers 
access to a power that would otherwise be either inaccessible (for atheistic 
or agnostic attempts to be moral) or ineffective (for religious approaches 
that recognize the source but misuse the power in question).
II. The Context and Primary Text of the Religious argument
Kant sets the stage for his religious argument by establishing in Part One 
of Religion that humanity (i.e., every normal human person) by nature has 
a “good predisposition” that is infected at its root by an “evil propensity.”13 
The latter perverts our moral decision-making process from the outset of 
our moral development.14 He goes on in Part Two to argue that a solu-
tion to this problem is possible only through a fundamental revolution in 
one’s character (a “change of heart”) that empowers a person to recover 
the proper way of making moral decisions—namely, to treat the moral law 
as one’s primary incentive for ethical choice, even when it conflicts with 
desires that arise out of our nature as phenomenal beings having specific 
mental and physical needs. Religion is possible, and inevitably arises in 
human societies, only because solving the problem of personal evil re-
quires “divine assistance” (i.e., what theologians typically call “grace”) 
to succeed (see note 25, below). Kant thinks philosophy is incapable of 
identifying a particular historical vehicle as necessary to bring about this 
result, though philosophy can establish a rational form that can test the 
12See Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion, where the summary of the argument’s 
structure is sketchy and slightly inconsistent with the more detailed account pro-
vided below.
13In my article, “Kant’s Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and 
universal evil Propensity in Human Nature,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
xLVI (2008), I argue that Kant uses a “quasi-transcendental” argument to defend 
both claims. In a nutshell, his argument (like that for space, time and causality in 
CPR) is that anyone who grants that we experience some degree of moral failing 
must accept the universal application of these two human attributes.
14In “Kant’s Quasi-Transcendental Argument,” especially §4, I demonstrate 
that Kant repeatedly portrays the moral depravity he attributes to human nature 
as having been there from the start, even though in some (admittedly mysterious) 
sense, each of us chooses to make it our own.
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validity of any historical faith’s claim to have conveyed god’s grace to a 
given community. As an example of this philosophical procedure, Part 
One (especially Section IV [Religion, pp. 39–44]) assesses the validity of 
the christian doctrine of original sin: it is “inept” in its typical historical-
genetic interpretation; but if understood as referring to the rational origin 
of all evil, it constitutes a suitable version of the practical (moral) problem 
that cries out for a religious solution (i.e., the problem of the evil propen-
sity in human nature). Likewise, Part Two (especially Section I, subsection 
B [pp. 62–66]) assesses the christian doctrine of grace through the atoning 
sacrifice of Jesus as morally harmful if presented in a way that removes 
the believer’s duty to effect his or her own self-improvement, but as “valid 
for us, as a precept to be followed” (p. 64) if it is understood as depicting 
an internal rational model (the “prototype of perfect humanity”) that each 
person should strive to imitate.
At the outset of Part Three, just when the attentive, religiously-attuned 
reader may think the problem of the evil propensity (or original sin) has 
been solved by the availability of the prototype of perfection (or atoning 
grace), Kant argues that, even if a person experiences (or claims to have 
experienced) such divine assistance at an individual level, the battle is far 
from over. The individualistic solution of Part Two cannot permanently 
solve the problem of personal evil, because the most any given person 
can do is to engage in a struggle between the newly empowered good pre-
disposition and the evil propensity. In the opening pages of Part Three 
Kant claims our tendency as human beings to act in self-centered ways 
remains a part of our nature, so even a “well-disposed” person, one who 
has experienced a conversion from evil-heartedness to good, will tend to 
be overcome by evil “as soon as he is among human beings.”15 He goes on 
to argue that the evil in human nature can be permanently overcome—i.e., 
a genuine victory of good over evil is possible—only when good-hearted 
15Religion, p. 94. Allen Wood, “Religion, ethical community and the Struggle 
Against evil” (Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October], pp. 504–505), interprets this pas-
sage as Kant’s conclusion that “[t]he source of evil . . . is social.” As I demonstrate 
in “Kant’s Quasi-Transcendental Argument” (2008), this ignores Kant’s own argu-
ments in Part One of Religion, that evil originates in reason and therefore must have 
a transcendental origin in any philosophical analysis. Human society is respon-
sible not for evil’s origin, but for its enduring presence. The point of Part Three’s 
Introduction is that people who have experienced a change of heart, who may 
therefore be regarded as “well-disposed” persons, are nevertheless still suscep-
tible to the influence of evil. Ironically, Wood himself points out (“Struggle Against 
evil,” p. 505) that if evil has a social origin, “then the most natural inference from 
this might be that the struggle against it should take the form of self-isolation (the 
solution of the hermit).” Yet as Wood observes (without explaining how this can 
be), Kant firmly rejects the hermit’s solution! He rejects it because hermits tend to 
attribute to society something grounded in individuals as members of the human 
species; society merely manifests evil in its most obvious forms. Having shown in 
Part Two how religion must attack the rational origin of evil in the individual, Kant 
now turns in Part Three to show how religion must attack its manifestation in 
society. If Wood were right, if Kant thought evil originated in society, the individual 
could not be blamed for making evil choices—an outcome Kant repeatedly warns 
against throughout Religion.
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individuals join together to participate in a religious community governed 
by rational (moral) principles.
Kant initially describes this community using a neutral, non-religious 
term, the “ethical community” (or ethical commonwealth) to indicate the 
rational form a religious community must take in order to fulfill its proper 
function. unfortunately, many (if not most) commentators emphasize this 
non-religious term to such an extent that they mistakenly portray him as 
saying this community is not genuinely religious. As a result, Kant’s theory 
of the ethical community is frequently discussed in the literature, while 
only rarely do we read about his theory of the church.16 Yet Kant explicitly 
argues in the first four subsections of Part Three’s Division One that the 
ethical community must become a religious community (a “church”) in 
order to succeed.
That this point is so frequently ignored indicates a bias among Kant-
scholars, many of whom would rather not think of their hero as sup-
porting the church (an institution whose empirical manifestation is often 
unenlightened), and who therefore tend to skip lightly over these sub-
sections. Nevertheless, in these pages, Kant clearly does argue from the 
duty of an ethical community to the necessity of the church as a religious 
community. In order to preserve their preference for “ethical community” 
over “church” as a description of Kant’s argument in Part Three, com-
mentators must neglect an argument presented in subsection II, where 
Kant first presents the ethical community as a unique duty of the human 
race to itself. What has been wholly ignored or (when acknowledged) 
downplayed is that Kant’s argument explicitly ties this duty to the rational 
need for “a higher moral being” (Religion, 98). embarrassing though this 
fact may be for skeptical or non-religious Kant scholars, the remainder of 
Religion examines not the ethical community as such, but the ethical com-
munity as religious—i.e., the church. my focus here will not be on those 
later sections of the book, but on the transitional argument that appears in 
the very section where Kant first claims that joining the ethical community 
is a special human duty.
The term “ethical community” is not Kant’s last word on the subject of 
how human beings can secure a lasting victory over evil, but only a tenta-
16examples of this biased emphasis abound. Rossi’s recent book (The Social au-
thority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical evil, and the destiny of Humankind [Albany: 
State university of New York Press, 2005]) is a good illustration, especially be-
cause the author cannot be accused of being anti-religious himself; yet his index 
entry for “church” (p. 192) says only “see ethical commonwealth,” and among the 
numerous subentries under the latter, “as church” cites only eight relevant pages 
(p. 193). Likewise, Wood exclaims (“Struggle Against evil,” p. 509): “it is virtually 
impossible to overestimate the importance of organized religion in Kant’s scheme 
of things.” Yet Wood explicitly uses Kant’s preferred term, “church” (p. 508), only 
once. For two exceptions to this trend, see Quinn (“Kantian Philosophical ecclesi-
ology,” Faith and Philosophy 17.4 [October, 2000], pp. 512–534), who tackles the is-
sue of “Kantian ecclesiology” head on, but neglects the crucial argument we shall 
be examining here, and Palmquist (“Philosophers in the Public Square: A Resolu-
tion of Kant’s Conflict,” in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, pp. 230–254), 
where I take seriously the potential for Kantians to take up public positions (e.g., 
as church leaders).
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tive first word. He makes this clear when, after comparing the “ethical state 
of nature” with the “juridical state of nature” in the first paragraph of sub-
section II (Religion 96–97), he argues in the second (and final) paragraph 
that the community’s purpose cannot be realized without weaving into it 
a belief in god as an internal moral lawgiver to all participants. After de-
scribing the ethical state of nature as one consisting “of inner immorality 
which the natural human being ought to endeavor to leave behind as soon 
as possible” (Religion, 97), Kant writes:
Now, here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward 
human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species 
of rational beings is objectively—in the idea of reason—destined to 
a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good 
common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought 
about solely through the striving of one individual person for his 
own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons 
into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.] toward a system of well-
disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which 
alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such 
a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs 
entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside 
within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of 
which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power: 
so the duty in question differs from all others in kind and in princi-
ple.—We can already anticipate that this duty will need the presup-
position of another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through 
whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insuf-
ficient on their own, are united for a common effect.
Following a brief transitional sentence, the heading of subsection III then 
identifies this being as “God” by stating, as if to clarify the conclusion of 
the foregoing argument, that “the concept of an ethical community is the 
concept of a people of god under ethical laws” (p. 98).
This densely-packed argument presents what I call a “religious argu-
ment” for god’s existence, where the term “religious” refers to a commu-
nity grounded in mutual belief in a divine moral being. Like its famous 
counterpart, the moral argument in the second Critique, it should not be re-
garded as a theoretically valid proof. For as we saw in §I, Kant devotes con-
siderable effort to demonstrating why all such proofs fail, and at no point 
does he backtrack on that position. But unlike the moral argument, where 
we find no more than an abstract “postulation” of God whose practical 
force rests in its ability to help us understand how moral conduct can be 
rational even though it does not always make us happy, this new argument 
carries with it an empirical (social) force that must, if successful, manifest 
itself in the unmistakably concrete form of the victory of good over evil in a 
human community—a goal explicitly stated in the title of Part Three. Be-
fore we can assess the validity of this argument, we must scrutinize Kant’s 
difficult language, carefully analyzing the argument’s logical structure. In 
§III I shall therefore go back through the above-quoted paragraph, analyz-
ing Kant’s argument one step at a time in hopes of unpacking the logic 
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of each premise, presenting each as itself the conclusion of a subordinate 
argument based on a distinct set of logical premises that Kant apparently 
expects the reader to recognize.
III. analyzing the argument’s Four Steps
The above-quoted paragraph from Religion, 97 begins by introducing the 
concept of a new and unique kind of human duty, “not of human beings 
toward human beings but of the human race toward itself.” Kant presents 
this duty as the first premise of his argument by defending it in a single 
sentence: “For every species of rational beings is objectively—in the idea 
of reason—destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the high-
est good as a good common to all.” This first step can be understood as a 
mini-syllogism with one implied premise and one key term, “the highest 
good,” only minimally explained. Understanding why Kant says so little 
here about the meaning of this key term is crucial to appreciating the force 
of his argument.
That “highest good” is a technical term in Kant’s moral philosophy 
might suggest he is here merely assuming its technical meaning, taking 
for granted that readers are familiar with his previous use of the concept. 
However, this would be a strange move, in light of his claim in the sec-
ond edition Preface that the arguments in Religion require no familiarity 
with his Critical writings, but “[o]nly common morality,” whose “matter 
itself is contained, though in other words, in the most popular instruc-
tion for children or in sermons, and is easily understood.” If the logic 
of Kant’s new argument is based on his technical concept of the highest 
good, then his failure to defend or even specify its meaning at this point 
commits the potentially fatal error of grounding his argument’s valid-
ity on an exceedingly problematic concept.17 Another possibility is that 
Kant does not describe or even mention his theory of the highest good 
here because this new argument does not depend on the details of that 
theory; rather, he uses the term in the quoted text as a general reference 
to whatever good one deems “common to all” members of the species. 
Kant himself obviously must think of this good as the situation where 
all people are rewarded with happiness in proportion to their virtue. 
But by calling it merely a “good common to all,” he here neither denies 
nor affirms his own preferred (and rather complex) way of defining the 
concept; he thus protects the religious argument from being unneces-
sarily linked to the validity of his previously defended moral argument 
for god’s existence—a dependence that would render his argument here 
so problematic (due to all the problems raised by critics of the moral 
17Largely because Kant mentions the highest good here as part of his argument 
that the ultimate victory over evil must be social, some commentators have argued 
that Kant meant the concept to be a socially-oriented one all along. Jennifer moore, 
for example, claims that throughout Kant’s ethical writings “the highest good is 
always a social good” (“Kant’s ethical community,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 26 
[1992], p. 55). By contrast, Rossi (Social authority, p. 7), thinks the social orientation 
of the highest good was not emphasized in Kant’s primary critical writings, where 
he defined that technical term as “the proper apportionment of happiness to ac-
cord with each individual’s moral virtue.”
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argument)18 that I could not hope to defend his position successfully in 
a single article.
Taking the text’s non-committal reference to “highest good” at face 
value, we can express the underlying logic of this first step (using paren-
theses here, as throughout the arguments displayed in this section, to de-
marcate premises Kant does not state explicitly, but merely assumes) as 
follows:
1. every species of rational beings is objectively destined to pursue a 
good common to all members of that species as its “highest good.”
2. (every species of rational beings has a unique, collective duty to 
pursue its objective destiny.)
3. The human race is a species of rational beings.
4. Therefore, the human species has a unique, collective duty to itself, 
to promote its highest good among all human beings.
Kant gives us no clue why he thinks the first premise is true. Apparently, 
he regards it as analytic: the very conception of a species of rational beings 
is the concept of beings who promote as their collective (highest) good a 
good that is common to all. In other words, promoting an alleged “highest 
good” that is not common to all members of the species would be irratio-
nal. Presumably, Kant would defend the second (implied) premise in a 
similar way, inasmuch as “objective destiny” refers to an end one would 
be foolish to work against. Regardless of whether Kant would require us to 
interpret “highest good” here in his technical sense, we can see that the 
main point of this first step of Kant’s argument is that the “duty” forming 
the basis of the overall argument is tied not to individuals, but to humanity 
as a species.
The next (third) sentence constitutes more than half of the quoted para-
graph and advances two intertwined claims that are best examined sepa-
rately, as distinct premises. The first is that this new duty requires “a union 
. . . into a whole” of all persons who are “striving . . . for [their] own moral 
perfection” as constituent parts of this big picture of human “destiny.” 
What Kant posits here is more than just a group of perfection-pursuing 
individuals, but individuals who together see their moral conduct as 
working toward “the highest moral good” of the species, in the form of “a 
system of well-disposed human beings . . . , as a universal republic based 
on the laws of virtue.” Kant’s actual argument is thread-bare at this point, 
merely previewing a claim he defends more fully in the next subsection. 
As we shall see at the end of §III, Kant’s subsection III argues that the laws 
governing an ethical community must be internally legislated in order to 
retain their status as ethical. As a result, we cannot establish the ethical 
community through any political (i.e., humanly-contrived, externally-
legislated) organization. It must be established in such a way that each 
18Peter Byrne (The Moral Interpretation of Religion [edinburgh: edinburgh uni-
versity Press, 1998], pp. 70–93) has argued, for example, that the moral argument 
in the second Critique fails precisely because the components of the highest good 
cannot withstand a rigorous philosophical analysis. For his most recent account of 
the argument’s failure, see Byrne, Kant on God, chaps. 5 and 6.
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member of the community generates the laws that govern the community 
within his or her own reason.
With the subsequent argument of subsection III in mind (summarized 
below in square brackets), we can reconstruct the logic of Kant’s second 
step as follows:
1. In order for the “common good” affirmed by this new duty to be 
truly common, it must include all morally responsible members of 
the species.
2. (The human species consists of individual persons each of whom is 
morally / internally responsible for his / her own conduct.)
3. [In a political community the laws are externally legislated and co-
ercive, so they cannot be “common to all”; there will inevitably be 
a “ruler” and a “ruled.”]
4. [In an ethical community the laws are internally legislated and non-
coercive, so they can be “common to all”; no human individual can 
legislate the moral law on behalf of another human individual.]
5. Therefore, this new duty must establish a purely ethical communi-
ty by systematically uniting the self-legislation of each person who 
pursues (however imperfectly) the ideal of his or her own moral 
perfection.
The first premise of this second subordinate argument merely explicates 
what Kant means by “common good.” The second premise, implied by 
the first, appears to be taken for granted as a basic tenet of any ethical 
system. It is analytic inasmuch as Kant would claim anyone who is not 
morally responsible should not be counted as a legitimate member of the 
community he is attempting to establish as necessary. As Kant discusses 
the rationale behind the third and fourth premises in subsection III, I 
shall examine them more fully at the close of §III. On the basis of these 
premises, the second major step in Kant’s argument follows as a necessary 
inference: if a species includes multiple individuals, if these individuals 
become good only through internal self-legislation, and if political and 
ethical legislation are (respectively) external and internal, then the com-
mon good must be internally legislated to each, yet applicable to all.
The third step in Kant’s overall religious argument comes in the same 
long sentence as the previous step: the unique duty introduced here can-
not be an individual duty, as all other Kantian duties are, because no single 
person could fulfill it. The most significant difference between this duty 
and all ordinary (individual) human duties lies in its novel application of 
a key principle of (Kantian) ethics, that “ought implies can.” The underly-
ing logic justifying this third premise goes like this:
1. For human beings, ordinary duties relate solely to what we know 
lies within our power to bring about (i.e., “ought implies can”).
2. We cannot know whether we have the power even to work toward 
creating the “whole” whose existence would fulfill this duty of the 
human species toward itself.
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3. Therefore, this new duty is unique: we do not know how it would 
be possible for individual humans on their own to work toward 
fulfilling it, though we do know the species as a whole ought to (and 
therefore can) fulfill it.
The first premise restates a fundamental tenet of Kantian ethics, one he 
has already employed earlier in Religion.19 The rationale behind the sec-
ond premise can be traced back to the limits of theoretical reason estab-
lished in the first Critique, preventing us from knowing (as a theoretical 
fact) whether we human beings will ever be capable of bringing about, as 
an objectively real phenomenon, this practical idea of the whole species 
united under a common good. This has already been discussed earlier in 
Religion (e.g., p. 20), where Kant insisted human individuals cannot see 
into the dispositions (i.e., the internal moral motives) of other persons. 
Practical reason can give us certainty that this idea constitutes our “objec-
tive destiny” even though theoretical reason leaves us uncertain whether 
individuals can even help to bring it about. The conclusion reached here 
(serving as the third premise of Kant’s overall argument) is that in this 
case, we can know what this duty requires (for our species), even though 
we do not know whether we can contribute anything (as individuals) to its 
fulfillment.
The last sentence of the passage quoted in §II conveys the argument’s 
overall conclusion. given that a new duty has been introduced, that this 
duty requires individuals to be united in a “universal organization” under 
ethical laws, and that “the forces of single individuals” are “insufficient 
on their own” to be “united for a common effort,” Kant concludes that in 
order to preserve its own integrity, reason “will need the presupposition 
of another idea, namely of a higher moral being,” to complete the work we 
humans cannot reasonably hope to accomplish. The steps leading to this 
conclusion can be displayed merely by restating the conclusions of each 
subordinate argument analyzed above:
1. The human species has a unique, collective duty to itself, to pro-
mote its highest good among all human beings.
2. This new duty must establish a purely ethical community by sys-
tematically uniting the self-legislation of each person who pursues 
(however imperfectly) the ideal of his or her own moral perfec-
tion.
3. This new duty is unique: we do not know how it would be possible 
for individual humans on their own to work toward fulfilling it, 
though we do know the species as a whole ought to (and therefore 
can) fulfill it.
4. Therefore (in view of our ignorance), reason needs to presuppose 
the idea of a higher moral being who can complete the work human 
19Kant refers only indirectly to this argument in the quoted passage. However, 
he repeats the “ought implies can” principle over and over again in the second Cri-
tique, in Religion, and elsewhere. In Religion, p. 41, for instance, he says that in every 
moral act it “must be within his [a moral agent’s] power” “to better himself.”
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individuals cannot reasonably hope to accomplish on their own in 
fulfilling this unique duty of the human species to itself.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the purpose of Kant’s argument 
in subsection II is to establish not that an ethical community is necessary, 
but that because its establishment is a necessary precondition for the ful-
fillment of human destiny, yet we cannot establish it on our own, we must 
view the community as religious.
An important point here—one Kant never tires of repeating—is that 
the necessary presupposition of God’s involvement in the fulfillment of 
human destiny does not (indeed cannot be used to) marginalize the impor-
tance of human effort toward self-improvement. Kant’s argument requires 
us to believe in god in order to assist the human community to fulfill a 
collective duty, yet without taking away the equally important require-
ment each individual has to work diligently for moral self-improvement. 
The latter remains necessary because without it we would not even have 
the building-blocks to make the required “whole” possible. That is, god 
cannot make us conform our wills to the moral law; but only god can unite 
these building-blocks—the almost unimaginable diversity of human will-
ing—into a consistent whole that we can picture as forming a coherent 
community.
This point becomes amply clear in the second paragraph of subsection 
IV (Religion, pp. 100–101), where Kant reaffirms the conclusion of his reli-
gious argument, reminding us that the only ground for rational hope that 
“a moral people of god” can be established is to regard it as “a work whose 
execution . . . [originates] from god himself.” Yet we cannot merely sit 
back and do nothing, “entrust[ing] to a higher wisdom the whole concern 
of the human race (as regards its moral destiny).” Instead, each individual 
must act “as if everything depended on him.” The reason Kant presents 
this as the “condition” that enables us to “hope that a higher wisdom will 
provide the fulfillment of this well-intentioned effort” is that his religious 
argument for god’s existence, as he presents it in subsection II, requires 
both factors: if we individuals are not doing our best to improve our moral 
conduct, no amount of assistance from a higher being can bring about a 
“common good”; but if there is no God, then all our efforts are wasted.20 
Only “well-disposed human beings,” therefore, are rationally justified in 
calling upon the conclusion of this religious argument, because only they 
have made the relevant “preparations” concerning what lies within their 
power to insure that this “whole” that is our common human destiny will 
“come to pass among them” (p. 101).
20As observed in note 11, Peters is one of the few interpreters to recognize the 
presence of a special new argument in the second paragraph of subsection II. 
However, he interprets the passage as an attempt to encourage hope in the possibil-
i ty of an ethical commonwealth becoming real and regards the introduction of the 
idea of god as dispensable (Philosophy of Hope pp. 106, 157–161). Yet this totally 
ignores the argument’s progression from the assump tion that building an ethical 
community is a human duty to the need for belief in God in order to fulfill this duty. 
Without religious belief, the argument would be powerless to convince anyone of 
the reality of anything!
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This religious argument for God’s existence is genuinely new and differ-
ent from Kant’s moral argument inasmuch as it encourages us to believe in 
god not for our own sake (i.e., to justify the rationality of our commitment 
to be moral), nor out of any sense of individual duty (i.e., any necessity 
practical reason may impose on each of us as a person); rather, Kant now 
urges us to believe in god for the sake of our species, because as rational be-
ings we realize that the destiny of our species, insofar as we are to fulfill 
what is implied by our rational nature, requires something we must hum-
bly acknowledge we are profoundly unable to accomplish on our own. We 
believe in god as the being through whom all the diverse duties we give 
ourselves as individuals (duties that, in light of each person’s autonomy, 
seem bound to stand in conflict)21 can be united in a single, self-consistent 
tapestry, called the common (or “highest”) good.
This is the main point Kant seeks to establish in subsection III, by dis-
tinguishing between a political and an ethical community. The only way a 
person can imagine how one’s individual duties can be consistent with the 
duties of others (especially all others!), Kant argues, is to regard all duties 
as emanating from a single, higher source. This source cannot be political, 
because then we would be dealing not with the free choice implied by the 
word “duties” (i.e., with ethics), but with the external constraint implied 
by the word “rights” (i.e., with politics).22 The problem, whose solution is 
Kant’s religious argument, arises precisely because the nature of this pro-
posed universal community must be ethical. As Kant frequently reminds 
us (e.g., Religion, p. 20), other people’s dispositions, the motives underly-
ing their choices, remain forever hidden from our view; we therefore can-
not be sure whether what other persons regard as their duty is consistent 
with what we regard as our duty. As a result of our inevitable ignorance in 
the face of apparently conflicting duties, we cannot even be certain we are 
21The argument analyzed here provides a new way of tackling the problem of 
how to harmonize conflicting duties within a Kantian framework: even though we 
cannot always understand how conflicting duties can coexist in a self-consistent 
moral system, we must believe that from god’s perspective the whole picture does 
make sense. Of course, some ethicists are bound to reject the proposed solution, 
for it requires ethics to present itself in religious clothing. Hare (“Kant on Recog-
nizing,” p. 470) refers to this as the “coordination problem,” correctly noting that 
in Part Three of Religion Kant argues that we must ultimately believe in god in 
order to solve it.
22As Lilla (“Kant’s Theological-Political Revolution,” p. 425) explains, “even if 
the public peace is maintained through the law, the moral state of man will de-
cline as social interaction transforms good inclinations into wicked ones.” Thus, 
a political community cannot be the vehicle for bringing about the existence of 
an ethical community. Both Anderson-gold (“Kant’s ethical commonwealth: The 
Highest good as a Social good,” International Philosophical Quarterly 26 [march], 
pp. 23–32) and Rossi (Social authority) neglect this important point, portraying 
political reform as a step toward religious / moral reform. By contrast, I argue (in 
“‘The Kingdom of God is at Hand!’ (Did Kant really say that?),” History of Philoso-
phy Quarterly 11.4 [October 1994], pp. 421–437) that, according to Kant’s under-
standing of human destiny, the influence of both political and traditional religious 
systems must subside as the authentically religious (and thus, moral) community 
gradually arises. On the paradoxical notion of a community governed by laws 
with no external form, see Palmquist, Kant’s Critical Religion, note VII.36.
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capable of bringing about the required unity of ethical purpose. The only 
solution is to introduce a moral being who can see into the depths of each 
person’s disposition and would therefore have the power to weave our 
different conceptions of duty into a consistent whole. Our need to under-
stand how this is possible, Kant argues, rationally justifies us in believing 
that god exists. Because moral commands come to each of us internally, 
they are not coercive in the way political laws are, so we can rationally 
hope God is capable of fulfilling the unity of purpose that reason tells us 
constitutes our human destiny.
IV. Concluding Implications Regarding the Power of Belief
In presenting his religious argument, Kant portrays divine assistance as 
the only way to satisfy reason’s special need to fulfill humanity’s destiny. 
He claims “this duty will need the presupposition of . . . a higher moral 
being” to be fulfilled.23 Is this claim justified? Kant thinks it is, because the 
only other option would be to suppose an ethi cal community could fulfill 
the destiny of the species even if it were based entirely on human organi-
zation. Yet if peo ple merely select a set of rules to govern the community 
of all well-disposed individuals, even if the explicit purpose of these rules 
is to encourage the members to act together for the common good, the 
status of such an organization would be essentially politi cal, not ethical. 
Other people are, after all, external to us. Although each individual might 
legislate the moral law internally, the whole community could only guar-
antee its unity by imposing these laws as an external (i.e., political) code. 
Thus, if we are left on our own, without being empowered by divine as-
sistance, the founding of an ethical community seems extremely unlikely, 
if not practically impossible.
If we accept Kant’s claim that god alone can guarantee an ethical com-
munity will be established, we might still ask what his argument aims to 
prove about our belief in god. Does it merely prove we must presuppose 
the idea of god, or does it set out to prove the more robust conclusion that 
an actual god must really exist? This is a thorny issue with an extensive 
literature, so here I can only outline an answer. As stated in §I, the first Cri-
tique established that the idea of god arises inevitably in the mind of any 
human knower who obtains empirical knowledge, and that belief in god 
is rationally possible (i.e., cannot be proved to be illegitimate), though not 
theoretically necessary. The second Critique then establishes that this same 
idea must be subjectively posited as actual in order for us human beings, 
as individuals, to make sense out of our inner conviction that behaving 
morally is at least part of living a meaningful life. Kant’s new argument in 
23Religion, p. 98, emphasis added. Rossi (“evil and the Power of god,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth Inter national Kant Congress, vol. 2, ed. gerhard Funke and 
Thomas m. Seebohm [Washington, D.c.: university Press of America, 1989], pp. 
369–382) comes close to recognizing the distinctiveness of this religious argument 
for God’s existence when he says Kant’s claim that the “complete attainment” of 
goodness “lies beyond human capacities” (p. 371) “helps open up a ‘logical space’ 
for an affirmation of God on the basis of ‘moral faith.’” However, he provides no 
detailed account of the argument Kant actually constructs in order to open up 
that “space.”
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the Religion passage analyzed above (in §III) can be described in two quite 
distinct ways. First, we can view it as claiming belief in the idea of god is 
now necessary, if we are to pursue the whole range of our duties as human 
beings (including the special, collective duty of our species). But what 
does “necessity” mean in this context? This is best answered by giving a 
second description that amounts to the same claim: our belief must be in 
an actual god (not merely in a convenient idea) in order for its purpose to 
be fulfilled. For Kant’s religious argument implies that, if the modality of 
god’s reality turns out to be merely possible (if all our god-postulation is 
merely wishful thinking), our ability to fulfill the destiny of our species is 
doomed to fail. We are therefore presented with a choice: either this god 
we believe in is actual, thus making both our belief and our moral life ra-
tional (for we can then reasonably hope its ultimate collective goal will be 
fulfilled), or this God we believe in is a mere idea, thus rendering our belief 
ineffectual and irrational (for the idea on its own could not have the power 
to fulfill the immense task Kant’s argument requires of God).
That Kant requires an actual god in Religion becomes clearer in the 
opening paragraph of Part Four, where he summarizes the essential mes-
sage of Part Three by restating his religious argument. He now portrays it 
in terms that explicitly emphasize god’s role in establishing and giving a 
religious character to the ethical community (Religion, pp. 151–152):
We have seen that to unite in an ethical community is a duty of a 
special kind (officium sui generis), and that, though we each obey our 
private duty, we might indeed thereby derive an accidental agree-
ment of all in a common good, without any special organization be-
ing necessary for it, yet that such a universal agreement is not to 
be hoped for, unless a special business is made of resisting the at-
tacks of the evil principle . . . by the union of all with one another 
for one and the same end, and the establishment of one community 
under moral laws, as a federated and therefore stronger force.—We 
have also seen that such a community, as a Kingdom of God, can be 
undertaken by human beings only through religion, and finally, that 
in order for religion to be public (a requisite for a community), this 
Kingdom is represented in the visible form of a church, the founding 
of which therefore devolves on human beings as a work which is 
entrusted to them and can be required of them.
In this restatement Kant follows the same basic steps as the argument 
analyzed in §III, so I shall not scrutinize this passage in such detail. The 
important point is that, having completed the arguments of Part Three, 
Kant now settles on a specific position regarding who is responsible for 
creating the ethical community. Kant here distinguishes two standpoints: 
establishing the community in its ultimate or ideal form, as “a Kingdom 
of god” (or “invisible church,” as he calls it in Part Three, Division One, 
subsection IV), can only be god’s responsibility. This cannot be a human 
duty, because we are powerless to bring it about. What is our duty, as 
Kant so clearly states in the above overview, is founding a visible church 
that approximates the invisible ideal. Without mentioning the potentially 
problematic concept of the “highest good,” referring instead only to the 
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less technical notion of “a common good,” he argues that a merely private 
religion (as portrayed in Part Two) will not suffice, as it will not have the 
power to overcome the social influence of evil. We are therefore faced, once 
again, with an ultimate choice: either we believe in an actual god who can 
and will establish this religious community (this “corpus mysticum”)24 or 
we give up our rational hope that our imperfect efforts to approximate 
that goal can ever effectively promote the destiny of our species.
This argument for god’s existence, grounded on reason’s need for public 
religion, is not the only argument Kant presents in Religion that could be 
described as a “religious argument for the existence of god.” For example, 
in the general Remark to Part One (Religion, p. 45), he employs a similar 
form of reasoning, but applies it to our need for private religious belief:
For, in spite of that fall, the command that we ought to become better 
human beings still resounds unabated in our souls; consequently, 
we must also be capable of it, even if what we can do is of itself in-
sufficient and, by virtue of it, we only make ourselves receptive to a 
higher assistance inscrutable to us.
In other words: (1) each moral agent has a duty to become a better person, 
changing his or her evil heart to a good heart; (2) no person can make such 
a change through his or her own power alone, due to the limitations of 
the human condition; (3) each moral agent must be able to make such a 
change, or it could not be a duty; therefore (4) a higher power must exist, 
to assist individuals in making the change from evil to good. Likewise, 
a few pages later (in the paragraph spanning Religion, pp. 47–48), Kant 
argues that “duty commands” us to bring about “a revolution” in our dis-
position in order to overcome radical evil; yet because we have no idea 
how this could come about by our own efforts, we must do whatever is in 
our power to ensure our conduct is consistent with our being on “the good 
(though narrow) path of constant progress from bad to better” and believe 
24In defending the thoroughly social nature of the highest good (see note 17, 
above), Jennifer moore quotes from CPR p. 836, where Kant calls the highest good 
a “corpus mysticism of rational beings.” Kant’s uncharacteristic use of mystical ter-
minology suggests he is thinking here of what he calls the “invisible church” in 
Part Three of Religion. This early hint does not detract from the primarily individ-
ualistic orientation of the highest good in the second Critique; rather, it confirms 
that for Kant the ultimate social goal of the highest good cannot be realized by 
ethics alone, but comes to fruition only in religion. moore (“ethical community,” 
p. 60) herself relates this CPR reference to the Religion passage I analyzed in §III, 
but states only that the passage shows that this mystical community “does not 
arise automatically from interaction among its members, but must be established 
or constituted—in this case, by moral . . . law.” Yet this is not Kant’s point! His 
point is that we must appeal to God in order to conceive of how the “mystical body” 
of all well-disposed persons can be established. Thus, while moore rightly says 
that “Kant argues in Religion that members must cooperate with each other to 
establish and maintain an ethical community” and that “our deepest and ultimate 
identity lies in our membership in a moral social order” (p. 62), she never even 
hints that in Part Three Kant makes these claims as part of his religious argument 
for god’s existence. 
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there is a god “to whom this endless progress is a unity”; we then have ra-
tional grounds to believe our “change can be considered a revolution.”25
Kant’s religious argument has two prongs. On one hand, it tells us 
that the atheist and agnostic must rest all hope for realizing the destiny 
of the human species solely on the abstract idea of an ethical community, 
while nevertheless admitting their utter powerlessness even to work to-
ward achieving that goal. How could we even begin to legislate genuinely 
ethical laws to each other, given that we have no access to each other’s 
dispositions? The only option for the atheist and agnostic, it seems, is to 
give up any hope of achieving the goal Kant regards as the destiny of 
our species.26 On the other hand, seen in the context of his whole critical 
philosophy, Kant’s argument guards against a false way of believing in 
god, regarded as an object of theoretical cognition (i.e., knowledge), and 
prepares the way for a more humble acceptance of god on the basis of 
practical cognition (i.e., faith). For when a “religious” movement develops 
along the former (false) lines, it invariably degenerates into an aggregate 
of self-deceptive individuals who cannot hope to form a genuinely uni-
versal community, inasmuch as the very people who claim to be acting on 
god’s behalf (through manipulative claims to “know god’s will”) end up 
thwarting the moral ends of humanity—and presumably also the ends of 
the god whose will they claim to know. This false approach, discussed in 
detail in Part Four of Religion, is what Kant was trying to guard against by 
developing in Part Three a religious argument that belief in the existence of 
a moral God is a necessary requirement for rational hope in the fulfillment 
of human destiny.27
We can now see that one of the chief objections to Kant’s moral argu-
ment for god’s existence, when expressed as a postulate of practical rea-
son, is overcome by Kant’s religious argument. What Lilla says about the 
“cold” comfort to be gained from Kant’s practical postulates may be true 
for the arguments in the second Critique; but Kant’s argument in Religion 
goes well beyond the postulates.28 If we interpret the religious argument 
25Limitations of space prevent us from examining here the logical steps in 
this individualistic version of Kant’s religious argument for god’s existence. In a 
nutshell, Kant’s point is that without being supported by belief in an actual god, 
human duty would reach an impasse, rendering human life meaningless, for the 
meaning of our lives is grounded in our moral nature.
26Peter Fenves appears to adopt this approach in response to his efforts to take 
seriously the effects of radical evil (Late Kant: Towards another Law of the earth, [New 
York: Routledge, 2003], p. 91): “All talk of an ‘invisible church’ may then become 
something of a joke, since it has the potential to raise a tense expectation that sud-
denly turns into nothing.” What Fenves ignores is that the hopelessness inher-
ent in the human situation, considered in a non-theistic way, is the very basis for 
Kant’s religious argument for god’s existence.
27Lilla (“Kant’s Theological-Political Revolution,” p. 426) expresses this insight 
by pointing out that Kant’s ethical (read religious) community is “transconfes-
sional and therefore can be seen as a threat to both [visible, ecclesiastical] church 
and state.” On the close parallel between Kant’s ethical and political theories, see 
Palmquist, “‘The Kingdom of God is at Hand!.’”
28Religion, pp. 412, 421; see §I and note 9, above. Ignoring the distinctiveness of 
Kant’s religious argument, Lilla (“Kant’s Theological-Political Revolution,” p. 421) 
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the way I am suggesting Kant intended it, religious belief ends up provid-
ing us with the very power so many commentators have found missing in 
Kant’s ethical system. As Lilla argues (p. 410): “man is religious because 
he is genuinely needy, to the very core of his being . . . Homo religiousus 
is homo cogitans in action.” Thus, the one factor that Lilla admits requires 
us to take Kant’s theology seriously is its psychological insight (p. 421): 
“What makes religion possible, in Kant’s view, is that reason has needs.” 
Lilla hints at Kant’s religious argument when he admits (p. 425) that for 
Kant the ethical community “is at most a ‘people of god’ living under eth-
ical laws within an organized church.” However, Lilla immediately quali-
fies this with the (unexplained) claim that for Kant this assumption was 
a mere “fiction.” What needs to be specified when a term like this is em-
ployed this way is that it has a special, technical meaning for Kant: it refers 
to a concept that has no empirical grounding in theoretical cognition, yet 
may nevertheless have a legitimate regulative role to play within the over-
all system of theoretical knowledge and may even have a constitutive role 
in practical cognition. As such, saying the invisible church is a “fiction” 
does not mean we can simply dismiss it, any more than we can dismiss 
ideas such as immortality or “the world” (i.e., the universe as a whole), 
simply because Kant calls them fictions, as far as scientific knowledge is 
concerned. Indeed, the religious community could hardly be more real, 
more powerful, than it is in Religion. Whereas Lilla may be seeing Kant’s 
project in an overly negative way when he says Kant “robbed christianity 
of the doctrinal crutches on which it had lazily leaned” (p. 432), he never-
theless rightly acknowledges that “his moral theology demonstrated . . . 
that religion was a permanent human need and that christianity, properly 
reformed, was the religion most suited to man’s moral improvement.”
Our analysis of Kant’s religious argument for god’s existence has en-
abled us to counter the claim often leveled against Kantian theology, that 
it leaves us wholly without assistance from god. As Lilla (p. 420) again 
puts it: “The autonomous man who finds himself free from these supersti-
tious dogmas [i.e., sin and grace] also finds he must now bear alone all 
the burdens god once helped him carry. . . . Now that man has reached 
the age of majority he must justify himself.” Such stark moral fatalism, 
however, is not the position Kant leaves us in. As this is not the place for a 
detailed assessment of his doctrines of sin and grace, we can merely note 
in passing that a proper understanding of his religious argument reveals a 
Kant who sees the relationship between god and human beings as one of 
partnership,29 not the absolute estrangement Lilla imagines. Thus, viewing 
human destiny from the divine / noumenal standpoint enables us to affirm 
claims: “The postulates of immorality and God are the most Kant can offer to meet 
this threat”—the threat of “self-contempt” robbing a moral person “of the confi-
dence we need to keep improving ourselves.”
29Hare similarly portrays Kant as defending the need for “our membership with 
god in the kingdom of ends” (Moral Gap, p. 467) as partners in building an ethical 
community (p. 468): “we share our final end with God, in the sense that both we 
and god aim at our own perfection.” In a footnote he adds (p. 477): “what Kant 
wants in our autonomous submission is both our will and god’s together, neither 
of them being sufficient without the other.”
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the opposite of Lilla’s position: as Kant sees our moral fate, we know of no 
conceivable way of overcoming the power of radical evil aside from divine 
assistance, we know of nothing we can do to justify ourselves apart from 
having practical faith in the prototype that has “come down” to dwell 
in human hearts, and—as Kant’s religious argument demonstrates—we 
know of no way to “work toward” fulfilling our human destiny without 
assuming that god shapes our diverse moral self-understandings into a 
“People of god,” an “invisible church.”
Kant’s vision of the moral community as religious ends up looking more 
like a communitarian moral theory than we normally think of Kant as 
defending. As Jennifer Moore points out, however, it is different from the 
communitarian vision (cf. note 17, above) in at least one key respect (p. 
68): “Community must flow from moral laws; moral laws cannot arise out 
of community.” What she neglects to mention is that because we human 
beings are all subject to an evil propensity and are unable to see into other 
people’s moral motivations, we cannot fulfill the duty of our species, to 
form, on the sole basis of the moral law within us, a harmonious whole 
that unites the multitude of different human wills that stand in poten-
tial opposition to each other. Kant does not think we have good reason to 
hope an ethical community (i.e., the ultimate community constituting the 
destiny of our species) will somehow come into being outside of religion. 
What moore says about Kantian ethics may be true, that “to act autono-
mously is in a fundamental sense to act in common with others.”30 But as 
his religious argument for the existence of God demonstrates, Kant offers 
hope that our human efforts may help realize such autonomy-in-common 
only for those who are empowered by the belief that human destiny ulti-
mately rests in god’s hands.31
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30J. Moore, “Kant’s Ethical Community,” p. 69. We can affirm what Moore (p. 66) 
says of the “ethical community,” though only as applied to the religious community, 
conceived as an ethical community created and sustained by god’s guiding hand: 
“We can reject the possibility of a universal ethical community [as religious]—but 
only at the price of rejecting Kant’s entire ethical vision.” That is, to reject Kant’s 
emphasis on the church is to doom his moral philosophy to inevitable failure.
31An earlier version of this paper was presented as the keynote address at a sym-
posium on “The Position of god in Kant’s moral System,” held at uce Birming-
ham in June of 2007. I would like to thank all who attended that symposium, as 
well as two anonymous Faith and Philosophy referees, for their helpful feedback.
